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
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

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THESIS

AMERICAN ACTIONS
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
AND GRENADA

by

Kenneth L. Brownlee

June 1985

Thesis Advisor:

Michael W. Clough

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— American Actions
in the Dominican Republic
and Grenada

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on US actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Grenada in 1983. Both of these incidents involved US military action in minor Caribbean island nations undergoing violent political revolutions. Both incidents had significant East/West ramifications.

These two incidents are compared and contrasted for policy similarities applicable to revolutionary regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean basin.

The specific areas addressed are similarities and differences in each situation regarding the motivations and objectives of the US national leadership, international and domestic repercussions of each action, and military objectives and method of application in each case.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The US used massive armed intervention during the 1965 Dominican Crisis and in 1983 in Grenada. Both of these rural Caribbean islands were undergoing violent political revolutions at the time US troops were introduced. Both of these actions involved a significant East/West conflict as well as danger to US citizens in the countries involved. The actions were conducted for the stated purpose of protecting US lives and to prevent a communist dominated regime from coming to power.

Latin American nations have traditionally feared being caught between US and European power struggles. The US is overwhelmingly the most powerful country within the hemisphere. Non-intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state is a fundamental principle of the Organization of American States. This paper will attempt to compare these two actions as they relate to potential US actions in the Western Hemisphere.

The comparison will address the motivations and objectives of the national leadership. What were the international and domestic repercussions of acting or not acting in these incidents? Are the similarities in the situations that existed in these two countries comparable and useful in predicting US policy toward Latin American revolutions?

Finally, what were the differences and similarities in the military objectives and method of application in these two events.

Neither of these events were planned as part of a long term orderly scenario. The policies as executed were enacted on short notice as dynamic answers to immediate problems.

The ideological identification of minor neighboring states does not threaten the vital interest of a major power. The development of a client state relationship with a hostile superpower, however, definitely affects vital and strategic interests. A US neighbor developing a client state relationship with the Soviet Union is distinctly not in the interest of the United States. We have consistently attempted to block the development of such relationship by diplomatic or military means.

There is in the Caribbean significant anti-American sentiment that has nothing to do with the East/West conflict. It remains from the early part of the century when the US repeatedly intervened in the affairs of Latin America and Caribbean nations. There is also a strategic US Soviet battle for influence in the same region. Although this is not a zero-sum game Soviet success at obtaining influence and allies in the Caribbean basin is unquestionably detrimental to US interests. It is detrimental to the

interests of US foreign policy, domestic policy, and strategic position.

Advocates of an activist policy argue that, "losses" of Caribbean countries in our own back yard weaken our alliances globally. Allies may doubt US willingness to act when such action may result in conflict. Bluffing only works when your opponent has reason to believe the bluff. Strategically, an increase in Soviet allies and military access in the Caribbean further complicates the problem of dealing with such a force should conflict occur. Soviet military access to Caribbean bases improves their strategic position relative to the US by reducing the logistical problems of supporting deployments in close proximity to the US.

Shipping routes through the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico carry about 45% of all US maritime trade as well as 55% of imported oil to the US. Additionally, the majority of NATO's resupply routes are from US ports on the Gulf of Mexico through the Florida straits and the Caribbean.¹

A. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN

US interests in the Caribbean dates to the early days of this republic. Jefferson and Washington in his farewell address implored Americans to avoid entangling alliances

¹The Soviet/Cuban Connection In The Caribbean, Washington D.C., Department of State and Department of Defense, 1985, p. 3.

with European powers. These early leaders recognized the advantage geography had given them in America's physical separation from the major powers of their world. On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine in an attempt to prevent further European influence in the Western Hemisphere and thereby potential conflict between the fledgling American republic and powerful European states. This proclamation stated:

We should consider any attempt on the...part of any European power... to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. We...view any interposition...by any European power... as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

European powers intervened in Latin America throughout the 19th century. At various times Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain intervened in Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Falklands Islands. US responses to these actions were inconsistent partly due to the inability of the US to effectively block them. When the French intervened in Mexico in the 1860's the US was involved in an issue with a greater degree of survival interest, the War Between the States. Additionally, occasional interventions were viewed by some as not completely inconsistent with US interests. The British occupation of the Falklands in 1833 had a stabilizing influence on commerce.²

²C. Neal Ronning, Intervention in Latin America, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 1-7.

During the first century of the US existence as an independent state, we were preoccupied with the domestic aspects of populating and taming a continent. As US power grew, America began to more vigorously protest European actions in "our" hemisphere. European powers generally refrained from taking US threats seriously, at least until the British/Venezuelan crisis of 1899. The US compelled England to submit to arbitration.³ This incident provided relief to Venezuela, who received valuable territory on the Orinoco river through arbitration. The incident also sowed seeds of anti-American sentiment within the hemisphere. Secretary Olney stated with extraordinary insensitivity:

No European power should forcibly deprive an american state of the right and power of self government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes or destinies... Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.⁴

The Spanish American War, Theodore Roosevelt, the Canal diplomacy, and Alfred Thayer Mahan all impacted on a rising American expansionist movement. Roosevelt and the canal fueled the American expansionist movement. The war with Spain provided new territory and Mahan's theories on sea power provided the argument and the answer for growing

³Fredico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1971, p. 68.

⁴Gil, p. 68.

American power. In the aftermath of WW I, America emerged as a bona fide world power. Europe had been decimated physically by the war. America was untouched physically.

The Caribbean along with the rest of Latin America feared they would be caught between traditional European colonial power struggles and an emerging US imperialism.⁵ European intervention in Latin America resulted frequently from unpaid debts. The problem as seen by Theodore Roosevelt was:

A chronic wrong doing or impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society... (which) may ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.

As the self appointed policeman of the Western hemisphere, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, and to prevent European intervention Roosevelt embarked on an era of intervention which reduced five Latin American countries to the status of protectorates: Cuba (1902), Panama (1903), Dominican Republic (1905), Nicaragua (1909) and Haiti (1915).

In the post World War II world, the Soviet Union replaced traditional European powers as the potential threat to the United States. The traditional European world powers no longer carried the colonial clout of the nineteenth century. The US, preoccupied with assisting the nations of western

⁵Ronning, p. 6.

Europe rebuild their war-torn economies and opposing Soviet expansion, largely neglected the less developed countries of the western hemisphere. In the post war world, Soviet occupation troops enabled Stalin to expand Soviet influence to Eastern Europe.

This neglect of the Western Hemisphere was demonstrated by their not being included in any regional economic assistance. Latin American economies suffered in WW II as well as those in Europe yet the US economic rebuilding plans were restricted to Europe and Japan.⁶

In 1950, the US committed ground troops to counter "communist aggression" in Korea. In this case, Soviets' imprudently allowed and the US deftly utilized diplomacy in obtaining United Nations backing to legitimize its action in the face of "communist aggression." Shortly after Korea, an intragovernmental memo, NSC-68, elucidated our government's concept of the difference between the US and Soviet strategic doctrine.

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution...to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure...liberty. In essence... to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society...founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. The fundamental design of the Soviet Union is to retain and solidify... absolute power, first in

⁶Earl T. Glauert and Lester D. Langley, The United States and Latin America, Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1971, p. 127.

Soviet Union and second in the areas they control... achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.⁷

The Truman Doctrine committed the US to contain Communism anywhere on the globe that it manifested itself. Communism and Soviet control were synonymous during the two decades following World War II.

In 1959, Fidel Castro forced Batista from power in Cuba. Batista had ruled a heavily corrupt government and twice took control in a military coup. Castro's victory was hailed in the United States as a victory for democracy. By 1960, Castro announced there would be no elections and began establishing closer ties with the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro's view of himself was one of regional power broker, a goal he could best pursue with Soviet financing.

Americans were surprised and shocked by Castro's announced Marxism-Leninism in Dec 1961. The Nationalist hero, who had driven Batista out of Cuba to restore constitutional government, had in less than two years become a communist dictator and Soviet ally 90 miles from Miami.

Soviet miscalculation, American unwillingness to adequately identify its interest, and Cuban machismo combined in October 1962 to bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. The Soviets were unwilling to go to war over missiles

⁷"NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," Naval War College Review, p. 54.

in Cuba, and we were not willing to go to war over Soviets in the Caribbean. War was averted. The US became determined to avoid another confrontation before it reached such dire circumstances.

Johnson like many elected politicians did not believe the American people were capable of recognizing the realities of the situation. The US electorate would not have tolerated a president "allowing a second Cuba to emerge." Johnson's lack of faith in the electorate's sophistication caused him to "embellish" the threat with characteristic Texas flair. The result was a loss of credibility that grew worse in Viet Nam and nearly tore the nation apart.⁸

Radical or revolutionary governments have not been universally opposed by American administrations. The US accepted revolutionary governments in Bolivia and Mexico to prevent their association with Germany. In 1961, the US increased aid to Bolivia to prevent its developing closer ties with the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's offer of economic assistance.

Also in 1961, the US backed the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. This action received partial backing from the Kennedy administration. The US was not prepared to expend the resources necessary to remove Castro. The

⁸James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1983, p. 13.

one phenomenon more costly than a military excursion is one that fails. This half-hearted, ill-planned excursion was doomed from the start. It cost US prestige, funds, credibility, and lives.

II. DOMINICAN CRISIS

On Wednesday April 28, 1965, 500 US Marines landed on the shores of the Dominican Republic for the immediate stated purpose of evacuating US citizens. This action drew harsh criticism from US press, academics, and Latin American leaders who argued that the action was a violation of the Rio Treaty. This action accomplished all of its immediate and underlying goals yet remains one of the most criticized events of contemporary US policy.

Critics of Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic such as Senator J. William Fullbright, Jerome Slater, and Abraham Lowenthal did so because they believed he was thwarting democracy, in fact driving non-communist leftist rebels to the communist camp. The critics view was that the revolution in the Dominican Republic was not communist controlled but leftist oriented. The administration view was that the movement was or would become communist, (Soviet/Cuban) controlled. Both of these view points were arrived at by a presentation of the facts, an objectivist view. Both were predicated on prior assumptions of the international system. What was for Johnson a major interest, involving preservation of the free world, was for his critics merely a peripheral interest. The notion of the US as primarily responsible for maintaining world order was not the isolated view of a right wing politician:

The present national security policy system came about in response to a world view that emphasized the necessity of American participation and leadership in a global struggle against an implacable communist foe.⁹

Diplomacy involves negotiation and compromise not confrontation but this view of American national security was biased toward action.

The argument made by Senator Fullbright to the congress that the administration made an early assessment that the coup was or would be exploited by communist is accurate.¹⁰ The administration and State Department were still suffering from the attacks by Senator Joe McCarthy. "McCarthy's ghost sat in numerous offices in 'foggy bottom.'"¹¹

, Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe, Soviet detonation of a nuclear device and communist victory in China combined to polarize US sentiment into an anti-communist fervor. This issue was unscrupulously exploited to the detriment of US interests by the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joe McCarthy.

The state department in 1965 had not yet recovered from its decimation at the hands of McCarthy. He had initiated a "red scare" during the early 1950's which led to such un-American activities as the "House Committee on Unamerican Activities" and "black balling" resulting in ruined careers

⁹Nathan and Oliver, p. 36.

¹⁰J. William Fullbright, Intervention in Latin America, C. Neal Ronning, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 56.

¹¹Nathan and Oliver, p. 38.

and loss of prestige among State Department employees and career diplomats. McCarthy stated in a speech in February 1950:

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotence in international affairs...is...because... the state department is thoroughly infested with communists. Foreign Service officers who had made predictions that Mao would overcome Chiang in China were blamed for the "fall." The presence of communists in the Dominican Republic was expected. There were communists present. Whether or not they would have mustered sufficient power to control the revolution remains in doubt.¹²

John Paton Davis a diplomat victimized by McCarthy observed:

Bold new ideas and quick decisions were asked of men... whose experiences for a decade had been that bold ideas and actions were personally dangerous and could lead to congressional investigations and public disgrace... purged from the right under Dulles...the left under Kennedy... How can you expect these men to do a good job.¹³

In the Dominican Republic there was no communist regime in power. Instead there was an attempted coup, rebels some of whom were communists, but many were constitutionalist. There was also anarchy. The US fear was that the Soviet and Cuban backed communist factions would successfully exploit the rebellion and gain control of the government.

This assumption was certainly not a foregone conclusion but not a completely unreasonable scenario. In Cuba only

¹²Nathan and Oliver, p. 32.

¹³Nathan and Oliver, p. 45.

six years earlier Castro had faced far greater odds when he toppled Batista.

American ambassador to Cuba Earl Smith, who had condemned the Castroite movement and Batista's anti-Castroite measures "was instructed to express impartial neutrality."

Herbert Mathews of the New York Times interviewed and photographed the guerrilla leader in the Sierra Maestra. Smith as a private citizen agreed that "Castro came to power partially by the failure of the state department to act decisively." Mathew's interview gave prestige, guerrilla terrorism was given little coverage.¹⁴

The Johnson administration weighed the odds and probabilities and concluded that he feared the possibility of a communist takeover greater than the criticism he would certainly take for intervening. Neither the policy makers nor the American public would have tolerated a "second Cuba" in the Caribbean. President Johnson said at a White House meeting on April 30, 1965:

We have resisted communism all over the world: Viet Nam, Lebanon, Greece. What have we done on our own doorstep....If I intervene, I can't live in this hemisphere. If I don't I can't live in this country.¹⁵

¹⁴Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy Of The United States, New York, 1968, p. 172.

¹⁵Meeting Notes, 4/30-5/15/65, Office Files of Jack Valenti, Box 13, LBJ Library, p. 12.

The Dominican Republic crisis occurred at a time when the US had committed itself to military support of the South Viet Nameese government against a communist North Viet Nam. Subjectively with the US committing troops in a far corner of the globe to "contain communism," coupled with the fresh memory of the Cuban missile crisis, the Johnson administration could easily be predicted to support any Caribbean government against a communist revolution. The questions then became: Is it a communist revolution?

Saturday, April 24, 1965, Donald Reid Cabral acting President of the governing Triumverate and Secretary of the Armed Forces was ousted by a military coup in the Dominican Republic. On Wednesday April 28th the United States Marines landed on Dominican soil with the immediate objective of protecting American lives. Within two weeks there were 22,000 American troops in the Dominican Republic with four expanded objectives: 1. Protect American and foreign lives. 2. Halt violence through cease fire and a peace keeping presence to separate the warring factions. 3. Prevent communist factions from seizing power. 4. Provide the option and atmosphere necessary for the Dominican people to hold free elections.

US foreign policy in the 1960's was an attempt to move Latin and Caribbean countries toward democracy. After Trujillo's assassination a naval task force maintained station in the Caribbean to block the Trujillo family's

attempts to regain control of the government. Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned on November 18, 1961:

The US would not remain idle if the Trujillo's tried to reassert dictatorial domination.

President Kennedy also prepared a contingency plan to use armed intervention to prevent a "Castro like" takeover. He recognized and opposed the oppressive Trujillo regime yet feared a Cuban/Soviet ally more.

We have three choices: establishment of a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro-like regime. We ought to aim for the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third.¹⁶

Under Trujillo nearly 2 million people were living in sub-human conditions. Many lived little or no better than the Haitians, the poorest of the hemisphere, 50% lived on less than one hectare of land.¹⁷

In early 1960 Trujillo had attempted to assassinate Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt, an outspoken anti-Trujillo leader. The Organization of American States (OAS) responded by imposing sanctions, breaking diplomatic relations, and instituted a petroleum and arms embargo. The United States citing OAS sanctions as authority reduced

¹⁶Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 11.

¹⁷Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, Lawrence Lipson trans, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 65.

sugar purchases (\$22,000,000). This action hit the heart of Trujillo's financial base and personal wealth.¹⁸

In the aftermath of Trujillo's assassination in 1961 through US initiated OAS pressure, Joaquin Balaguer emerged as the most moderate and least corrupt of the Trujillo government. Balaguer appeared suitable as a vehicle for the democratization of the Republic. US activism in this instance was demonstrated by President Kennedy's remarks regarding Balaguer:

The anti-communist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy.¹⁹

Balaguer was replaced by a seven man Council of State which would govern as a transitional body until elections could be held in December 1962.

The three major parties had arisen quickly following Trujillo's death. The Dominican Revolutionary Party headed by Bosch, the National Civic Union (UCN), dedicated to the struggle for democracy against Trujillo, the 14th of June Political Group (1J4). The 1J4 was an anti-Trujillo, Castro-like party "ready to sacrifice political democracy for social justice."²⁰ Rarely does a one party system result in social justice.

¹⁸Lowenthal, p. 8.

¹⁹Lowenthal, p. 9.

²⁰Gleijeses, p. 40.

The US government contributed to the Dominican democratic process through public and private means acting as a go between among political factions. In mid January General Wessin y Wessin attempted a military coup. The US threatened to cease the newly approved financial aid and reimpose strict sugar quotas if the Council of State was not reinstalled.²¹ The threat of US economic sanctions and potential military action was sufficient to avert the coup.

The election resulted in victory for Juan Bosch, orator, writer, and intellectual leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). Bosch was an anti-Trujillo leftist, who promised social reforms.

The Dominican Republic had little experience in democratic government. Many of those left over from the Trujillo regime remained in power particularly in the military. These individuals were not disposed to be dispossessed of their privileged position. They resisted President Bosch's changes.

During Bosch's eight month tenure as President he proved to be more adept as an orator than as an administrator. His administration faced massive problems in dealing with the post Trujillo Dominican Republic. He wasn't skilled enough to succeed. The Dominican economy slumped further amid Bosch's ineffectual political leadership. Bosch was not

²¹Lowenthal, p. 12.

politically astute. A vain and arrogant man he expected followers rather than sought political friends.²²

The US sought to promote the democratic process in the Dominican Republic granting aid. The US increased sugar quotas to help stimulate a failing Dominican economy. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was very active in supporting (advising) the administrations of Dominican President Juan Bosch.

Martin was so extensively involved in the day to day affairs of the Bosch government. He stated that: "Bonnely and the other councilmen seemed to feel I was one of them."²³ Bosch was a strong nationalist who no doubt resented all this unsolicited and paternalistic advice. Bosch had been deeply affected at the age of 7 when he saw the Dominican flag lowered and replaced by the US flag. He sought cordial relations with the US but not a close association.

Support became a decision in which Ambassador Martin defined Bosch in terms of pro-American or anti-American. The possibility of a pro-Dominican position separate from American interests apparently did not occur to the Ambassador.

Juan Bosch as characterized by Ambassador John Bartlow Martin was a good orator and poet but a bad administrator.²⁴ His brief administration according to Ambassador Martin

²²Gleijeses, p. 285.

²³Gleijeses, p. 96.

²⁴Transcript of Oral History of John Bartlow Martin, .BJ Library.

...may well have been the most honest in Dominican history....

He slashed salaries of his ministries in half and his own almost 40% from \$2000 to \$1000 p/month and his own from \$2400 to \$1500. He waged a war on corruption in government in a country with corruption so deep that it became his downfall.

Threats to military leaders and ministers who rotated the lucrative jobs among themselves were not Bosch's only problem. He threatened their privileged position. He lost the backing of the church in a Roman Catholic country due to his position on the legality of marriage, cohabitation and the legal legitimacy of children born out of wedlock. His position was socially progressive, practical, and too radical for a conservative clergy.²⁵ A powerful institution in a country 95% Catholic. Unemployment increased and the economy continued to fail.

In land reform the overlapping agencies and complex litigations resulted in only 40 families settled by July 1963. His popularity among the disillusioned masses dropped.²⁶

Ambassador Martin requested an aircraft carrier be sent to the Dominican Republic to show support for Bosch in

²⁵Gleijeses, p. 88.

²⁶Gleijeses, p. 92.

September 1963.²⁷ President Kennedy, who had been prepared to use military force to prevent a communist takeover was unwilling to send a carrier in support of Bosch. On the assumption that Dominicans could best solve Dominican problems, the US attempted to remain on the sidelines. The US objective was to see democracy flourish in the Caribbean. US policy operated on the assumption that although a Soviet or Castro type of totalitarian regime can be imposed on a country, democracy cannot be imposed but must be allowed to develop. The US sought to walk a delicate balance between the tolerance needed for the growth of democracy without allowing communist cancer to gain a strangle hold on the young state.

The nature of the regime in the Dominican Republic was not vital provided it wasn't Soviet affiliated. Kennedy's refusal to send the aircraft carrier was predicated on the fact that the US would not intervene except to prevent a communist take over of the government. In 1965 "communist" equated to Soviet.

The coup that overthrew Bosch in September of 1963 did so for several reasons, not the least of which was jealousy and hunger for power. However, he had lost virtually all of his support, public, politicians, clergy, and the military.

²⁷Lowenthal, p. 13.

The existence of communist in his government, or the charge that Bosch was soft on communism while never proved was venomously repeated by political opponents of Bosch and by the clergy.²⁸ The military fearing the growth of a communist threat, in which they would be executed as Batista's Generals were in Cuba, acted.

The coup led by General Wessin y Wessin formed a Junta and agreed to hold elections by September 1965. The decision to recognize the Junta was made by Kennedy in late November. The actual recognition was delayed three weeks due to Kennedy's assassination. The administration didn't want to give a false impression of a shift in policy due to the new president.²⁹ The junta became the Donald Reid Cabral government. This government never developed a base of support. It was considered to be remnants of the old oligarchy and was an almost immediate target of the extreme left.³⁰ The US diplomatic and intelligence corps, however, believed that by 1965 Reid was doing a good job and a majority of people opposed Bosch's return.³¹

²⁸Gleijeses, p. 97.

²⁹Martin History, p. 20.

³⁰CIA memo, 7 May 1965, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican Crisis, Box 7, LBJ Library, p. 4.

³¹Transcript of Oral History of Thomas Mann, LBJ Library, p. 17-24.

The Dominican Republic had held one election in thirty years, electing a government that lasted 8 months. The senior military officers were Trujillo's proteges, their immediate subordinates identified with the opposition. General Wessin y Wessin had attempted a coup of the council of state thwarted by Kennedy. Bosch and Balaguer had common problems chief among them: the opposition of the Generals facing lost privilege and potential wealth, and a floundering economy.

US at first withheld recognition of the Post-Bosch Junta pressing for more PRD members in the government and free political activity for all non-communists. The administration never had a well defined policy toward the Dominican Republic. Martin had become disillusioned with Bosch. The US believing he had lost his countrymen's support refused to intervene on his behalf.

Reid Cabral was hard on communists and on the military. He deported members of the radical left and right. Additionally, he followed Bosch's reforms in closing the smuggling operations of corrupt military officers. Reid Cabral's reforms were too radical for some of the more senior officers and not broad enough for the junior officers. His regime also was beset by continuing economic difficulties and, by the spring of 1965, rumors that he would not allow free elections to be held in September as scheduled. This rumor although unsubstantiated fueled unrest among those already impatient with his administration.

The economic crisis was exacerbated by low sugar prices and unusually severe drought. The economy dropped to its lowest point in forty years. Reid Cabral attempted to implement an austerity program to restore the country's balance of payments, approved by the IMF. The populations looked to the national palace for relief but the government itself was in great financial difficulty.³²

At the time of the coup Ambassador W. Tapley Bennet was out of town having been recalled to Washington for consultation regarding the worsening conditions in Dominican Republic. He had departed Santo Domingo Friday after consulting with Reid. Both men were aware of rumors of an upcoming coup, but Reid agreed that he didn't anticipate any trouble in the immediate future. CIA estimates placed the probable date of the coup at no earlier than June 1st.³³

The coup that began on April 24 progressed in three phases. The first phase lasted from April 24 to April 27. It began on the morning of April 24 when General Morros A. Rivera Cuesta, the Army Chief of Staff, advised Reid Cabral that several influential army officers were definitely involved in a pro-Bosch conspiracy. Rivera Cuesta then confronted the conspirators and was arrested.³⁴

³²Lowenthal, p. 39.

³³Lowenthal, p. 50.

³⁴Lowenthal, p. 61.

The coup was, therefore, carried out prior to its planned date and caught much of the anti-Reid Cabral factions unprepared. This phase was predominately a group dedicated to returning Bosch to power without elections. June 1, was the date scheduled for campaigns to begin for the September elections.

The pro-Bosch group was a loose association of military officers with little in common; some acted out of a belief that the military must cleanse its honor for its actions in toppling the Bosch government. Many were frustrated by the political in-fighting following the end of Trujillo's regime. Some were jealous of the profits of the senior officers and officials or disgusted by their flagrant corruption.³⁵ Many who were not involved with the rebellion quickly joined "to settle old scores" with Wessin y Wessin.³⁶

The military represented the only coherent force in the Dominican Republic. The rebels fearing that the military high command would take swift action to suppress the rebellion began passing out weapons to civilians on the first day of the rebellion. Colonel Francisco Caamano directed that the arsenal of the "27 February" camp be

³⁵Lowenthal, p. 52.

³⁶Lowenthal, p. 52.

opened.³⁷ This action allowed extremist groups to obtain weapons and resulted in anarchy.

Throughout the weekend the situation in Santo Domingo was chaotic and confused. Government troops under Wessin y Wessin's command were slow to react. Radio announcements contradicted one another throughout the day and left doubt as to who was in control. Jose Francisco Rene Gomez announced General Rivera Cuesta's arrest on Radio Commercial, followed immediately by a denial of the coup by Radio State Santo Domingo. However, shortly after this announcement Radio Santo Domingo proclaimed a 6 p.m. curfew.³⁸ PRD leaders took over a Radio Santo Domingo studio and announced that:

...young and honest officers dedicated to constitutionality had overthrown Reid.

Charge' Connett reported Saturday night that the insurrections appeared to be limited to the 27 of Feb. camp and restricted to some officers and NCO's. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Cespedes, and Navy Commadore Rivera Caminero were backing Reid and Wessin y Wessin was expected to join them. The embassy was not certain what the rebels intended but their success seemed remote.³⁹

³⁷ CIA memo, p. 5.

³⁸ Lowenthal, p. 65.

³⁹ Embtel 1037, April 25, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican crisis 1965, Box 4, LBJ Library.

Elements of the army continued to join the rebels while Wessin y Wessin refused to respond; 2/3's of the army units in the vicinity of Santo Domingo were in revolt. Reid delivered an ultimatum to the rebels occupying the two rebel camps to surrender by 5 a.m. Sunday morning.

By Sunday, the air force chief of staff refused to act against the rebels and Wessin y Wessin claimed he could not operate his tanks without air cover. General Imbert offered Reid his assistance in exchange for a cabinet position and then to the rebels when Reid informed him the appointment was impossible. Imbert later became head of a junta. His forces aggressively attacked the rebels with air strikes and artillery in populated areas of the city. There were civilian casualties.

Reid desperate for support asked for US troops claiming "Communists activists were at work." American officials believed that there were only a handful of officers committed to Bosch's return and that the rebellion was at least as much anti-Reid Cabral as pro-Bosch. The rebellion appeared to be confined to the military. Therefore, the embassy considered a junta guaranteeing elections a practical and agreeable solution.

The crowds were incited to violence, the national police, who had attempted to remain politically neutral and maintain order were singled out and attacked until most abandoned their distinguishing uniforms. An armed band sacked and

burned the anti-communist, some say fascist newspaper Prensa Libre. The owner Rafael Bonnilla Aybar took refuge in the Guatemalan embassy. Street crowds looted houses and stores and murdered. At 10:30 Sunday morning, Reid decided to resign and notified the American embassy. Shortly after 11:00, Colonel Caamano arrested Reid Cabral.⁴⁰

The military high command, who had refused to defend Reid Cabral, now refused to allow Bosch's return and were willing to fight to prevent it. The anti-Bosch military chiefs notified the rebels that they would attack unless Molina Urena, designated by Bosch to accept the presidency in his absence, stepped aside in favor of a junta. They offered to guarantee elections in return.⁴¹

The service chiefs requested US support but none was given. The rebels did not respond and all three services moved against them. Colonel Caamano took refuge in the El Salvadoran embassy believing that air attacks were ineffective and the rebels responded by calling for mobs to sack the homes of Air Force officers. They gave addresses and paraded captured Air Force wives on television.

⁴⁰ Embtel 1045, 1965 April 25, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican crisis 1965, Box 4, LBJ Library.

⁴¹ Embtel 1062 April 25, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican crisis 1965, Box 4, LBJ Library.

The embassy sought to remain neutral, Ambassador Bennett ordered the aircraft carrier, USS Boxer, within sight of land with her aircraft struck below as a demonstration of US neutrality. The prominent role aircraft carriers had played in Dominican affairs supporting or demonstrating US resolve was significant, unfortunately, the subtlety of the maneuver was apparently lost due to the misunderstanding of the Boxer's purpose.⁴²

By Monday, Santo Domingo was in chaos, as a result of the early rebel policy of passing out weapons so freely. The streets were filled with armed civilians not under control of the rebel or loyalist leaders. Under these conditions the communist factions who had received training and had a well organized, although small, group attempted to assume leadership.

There appeared to be an opportunity to form a junta that would guarantee free elections in September. Rebel leaders refused to endorse a junta that included Wessin y Wessin. General Wessin insisted that he or his confederate must be part of the junta or his troops would attack. Neither side would compromise nor trust his opponent. The embassy pressed for the junta but their efforts were hampered by poor communications and inability to guarantee a cease fire in which to conduct talks.

⁴²Lowenthal, p. 65.

On Tuesday the last opportunity to influence the revolution short of armed intervention was missed. Molina Urena requested Ambassador Bennett's assistance in mediating talks. Ambassador Bennett instead lectured rebel leaders for initiating the carnage by their free lance distribution of weapons. He pointed out that rebel forces had taken advantage of every cease fire to improve their position thereby jeopardizing the process. Loyalist forces had the rebels on the run at this time and Ambassador Bennett had reason to believe that General Wessin y Wessin and General Guerro would soon defeat the revolt. These two Generals did not trust each other. Both demonstrated extraordinary caution due to poor communications and distrust of the others intentions.

Many of the pro-Bosch rebels fled the revolt at this time. However, when loyalist forces failed to press their advantage Caamano and a dedicated cadre returned. These men had been insulted and the lack of cooperation among loyalist forces made them more determined than ever.

The embassy telegrams continued to be confusing, emphasizing both "worsening conditions" yet clinging to belief that "loyalist forces would prevail." Much of the confusions resulted from the lack of communications within the city and the near state of anarchy that prevailed. On Wednesday the 27, US citizens, mostly tourists, gathered at the Embajador Hotel for evacuation. "300 rebels surrounded the hotel

and terrorized the evacuees waving tommy-guns and shooting up the lobby."⁴³

This incident coupled with the police's inability to even protect themselves demonstrated their inability to protect innocent bystanders despite the fact that no one was injured.

At 3:20 p.m. Wednesday, President Johnson's staff meeting was interrupted by a request for 1200 marines to restore order from Ambassador Bennett. This request was refused, two hours later at 5:16, Washington received a request for marines to safeguard American lives. The marines were to re-inforce embassy guards and provide security at the evacuation site after military and police stated they could no longer provide security. President Johnson still in the White House Staff meeting briefly discussed the request and granted it.⁴⁴

The US faced no easy choices in the Dominican Republic. Reid Cabral lost the support of the population and the military. The US could not be expected to militarily support a regime with no domestic backing. Bosch was regarded as ineffectual, additionally, he too had lost much of his popularity and it was the US assessment that his return would not be welcomed by a majority of Dominicans. The

⁴³Embtel 1121, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican crisis 1965, Box 4, LBJ Library.

⁴⁴Valenti Meeting notes, p. 13.

Dominican military high command appeared more interested in personal gains than national issues. In the election held in December 1966, Balaguer won with a 56% majority.

The US attempted to appear neutral. In the beginning the embassy staff believed that the loyalist forces would put down the rebellion. As the rebellion progressed into the second phase many of the original rebels gave up but a smaller and more dedicated force remained. US forces distributed food and medicine to unarmed men, women, and children of both sides.⁴⁵ Their fear of communist infiltration of the rebel movement produced a natural alignment with the loyalist. The US did not fully support the loyalist position. As a result US soldiers and policy was unpopular to both sides, the Dominicans shouted "yankee go home."

The OAS held a regular meeting on April 28, at which the US requested discussion of the Dominican situation. No specific action was recommended nor taken. The US did not anticipate a need for direct action at that time. Later that evening the US requested a special session. This session took place the next morning at 10:30 but the Council took no action. The Council instead recessed for forty-eight hours to seek instructions from their governments.

⁴⁵ Briefing on Situation in Dominican Republic, Wednesday, July 14, 1965, National Security Files, National Security Council History, Dominican Crisis 1965, Box 7, LBJ Library, p. 74-121.

The United States notified and consulted major Latin American embassies regarding US action, after the fact. The OAS was not consulted prior to implementing troop decisions. The decision to land marines was made to answer an immediate problem. The action was supported by many diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo. On April 29 the Mexican, Peruvian, Guatemalan, and Ecuadorian Ambassadors asked for US security forces to protect their embassies.⁴⁶ Eventually the security force encompassed embassy row at their request and many availed themselves of the opportunity to evacuate nonessential members of their diplomatic staff and families.

The Johnson administration realizing that continued unilateral intervention would result in severe Latin American criticism attempted to dispel the criticism by employing an OAS collective action. The concept termed Betancourt-Figures plan, an OAS military command under the command of a non-US officer. This command would be pro forma, as the US would be the principal supplier and would actually control the force.

On May 6, the OAS voted to establish an Inter-American Peace Force largely through the able efforts of US Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker. The initiative was passed after three days of intense work by the exact number of

⁴⁶ Dominican Action 1965 Intervention or Cooperation?, The Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, July 1966, p. 29.

required votes, including that of James Antonia Bonilla Atilas, representative to the OAS from the then defunct Reid Cabral government.

The Inter-American Peace Force was created from elements of six countries: Brazil, 1,152; Honduras, 250; Paraguay, 178; Nicaragua, 159; Costa Rica, 21; and El Salvador, 3. The entire force was under the command of Brazilian General Hugo Alvim. US General Bruce Palmer was second in command. General Palmer in keeping with US policy of ultimate control stated that in the event of a policy conflict he would have to follow the instructions of his government.

The countries of the OAS adopted the initiative primarily because they could accept a semblance of collectivity better than unilateral US action. The US had made it plain by deed and word that we were going to act.

The Dominican crisis was a situation in which the US unconvinced of the need for allies acted in a manner to ensure control. The actions were conducted in a hesitating manner with never any clean cut long term objective other than protect US lives and prevent another Cuba. US troops entered the Dominican Republic in phases, albeit quick phases, much as we did in Viet Nam. The first contingent entered to provide security for evacuees and embassy personnel. The second contingent arrived to reinforce security troops. The loyalist meanwhile stopped fighting. Rather, they waited for the US troops to clean out the

communists. The rebels considered US forces as aggressors and opened sniper attacks.

The US got involved in a civil war in two stages: initially to protect US and Foreign lives; secondly, because we believed the revolt was communist controlled. Dominicans were obviously suffering. Dead bodies lined the street. There was wide spread killing and decaying bodies in the street. The Dominican Red Cross estimated that 2,500 people were killed between April 25, and April 29, most by wild firing and mob action.⁴⁷

The US diplomatic corps was too timid to refute claims of communist influence. Former Ambassador Martin stated that he believed the CIA reports had exaggerated communist activity during his tenure. He did not refute the report because he couldn't be sure of its accuracy. It was safer to assume the worst.⁴⁸ Furthermore asking these men to take such a stand in the aftermath of McCarthy may have been asking too much. President Eisenhower, the congress, and the news media share the failure for not exposing McCarthy's diatribes for the rhetorical hogwash they were.

The Johnson administration's actions in this instance were not the result of a carefully studied policy. Rather they were the manifestation of a stumble along policy, a

⁴⁷Dominican Action 1965, Intervention or Cooperation,
p. 23.

⁴⁸Oral History of John Bartlow Martin, LBJ Library.

series of decisions to answer immediate problems. The close personal control that President Johnson insisted upon reduced his rôle to that of an action officer handling the nosiest problem in his "in basket." There was sufficient reason to believe US citizens were in danger in Santo Domingo. Given Johnson's view that communists in the Caribbean represented a vital interest, the chance to reflect on the long term nature of his actions would have probably had no effect.

Despite the tremendous problems and questionable legality of this operation, it resulted in democratic elections in 1966. The triumph of the operation was in 1978. For the first time in the history of the Republic a head of state, President Balaguer, transferred power peacefully to an opposition candidate, PRD candidate Antonio Guzman Fernandez.

III. GRENADA

On October 25, 1983, a combined force of US Marines and Rangers, followed by 750 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne and an Eastern Caribbean multi-national force of 300 men,⁴⁹ stormed ashore on the island of Grenada. This action termed a "Rescue operation" by President Reagan was conducted in response to a request from Grenada's Governor General Sir Paul Scoon.

The operation was conducted primarily to prevent 1,000 US citizens mostly medical students on the island from becoming hostages. Grenadian spokesmen had insisted they were in no danger. The underlying reasons for the actions were: To restore the opportunity for democracy from chaos and remove the Soviet threat generated by the New Jewel Movement from power.

The mission code named operation "Urgent Fury" accomplished all of its goals. The operation was an overwhelming military success and diplomatic failure. It resulted in international condemnation: "The US was the sole negative vote on a United Nations resolution deploring the action." European allies vocally denounced the act and British Prime Minister Margaret

⁴⁹ The Eastern Caribbean Force was comprised of troops from six Caribbean Island nations: Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Jamaica, and Barbados.

Thatcher complained that the US had invaded commonwealth territory against their advice and without prior consultation.⁵⁰ Despite the international reaction, domestically a majority of US citizens approved of the operation.⁵¹

The Reagan administration expected to take heavy criticism, but as one of the members of the organization of Eastern Caribbean Force stated:

American intervention might be distasteful but the US had to do something about Grenada⁵²

This dilemma is that of a modern nuclear superpower struggling to contend with the complex problems of competing interest in an anarchial international forum. It was domestically popular because it was quick and successful. It came at a time when the US had been injured by evil in the world and frustrated by our inability to counter it. The US public saw the action in terms of good versus evil in which US actions may not have been legal but were just.

The US view of the Soviet Union softened with the adoption of detente, but the Afganistan invasion and in September, 1983,

⁵⁰ Kenneth Auchincloss, John Walcott, and Howard Fineman, "Americans at War," Newsweek, November 7, 1983, p. 62-64.

⁵¹ David Halpern, "How the Public See's It," Newsweek, November 7, 1983, p. 65.

⁵² Mark Whitaker, and others, "A Crisis in the Caribbean," Newsweek, October 31, 1983, pp. 40-43.

KAL 007 sobered US judgement of the Soviets. In September 1983 the Soviet Union deliberately shot down an unarmed civilian airliner (Korean Air Lines Flight 007) that had strayed into Soviet air space, killing 269.

President Reagan swept into office in 1980 on a wave of increased awareness of defense needs in the wake of the "Iranian hostage crises." Fifty-two US citizens, members of the US government, were held hostage for 444 agonizing days. Diplomatic efforts finally returned these US citizens, but the process was excruciatingly long and was accomplished only after a man perceived as much more militant took office, Ronald Reagan. The Carter administration completed the negotiations but the hostages were actually released immediately after Reagan's swearing in, a final Iranian insult to Jimmy Carter.

President Reagan feared US medical students would be taken hostage and frustrated by KAL 007 incident, he received the plea for help within twenty-hours of the news that a suicide bomber had taken the lives of 239 marines in Beirut. These men part of a multilateral peace keeping force were located in a susceptible area for political reasons. This incident probably added incentive to act where no additional incentive was needed.

Grenada is a small tropical island in the eastern Caribbean. It was a member of the British Commonwealth, receiving full right of internal government in 1967 and

independence Feb. 7, 1974. It has a rural population predominately made up of descendants of slaves and indentured servants. The country has a tradition of plantation autocracy and strict racial consciousness.⁵³ Its culture has made Grenada susceptible to the charismatic leadership style of Sir Eric Gairy and Maurice Bishop.⁵⁴

Gairy, a union organizer and right wing strongman, was a populist radical of the 1950's. His leadership inspired strikes and demonstrations in 1951 that resulted in British intervention to restore order in St. Georges.⁵⁵

Gairy subsequently won six elections and became Prime Minister in 1967. Gairy maintained control through violence and political intimidation enforced by his private army, the "Mongoose Gang." However, as his behavior became more bizarre and unemployment rose to 40% a new charismatic, well-educated leader came on the scene in the person of Maurice Bishop.⁵⁶

The New Jewel Movement was founded by the joining of two radical parties, the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation and the movement for the Assemblies of People. The new party adopted a socialist platform, organized strikes,

⁵³Anthony P. Maingot, The United States in the Caribbean, Tad Szulc, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1971, p. 53-66.

⁵⁴Jiri Valenta, "Leninism In The Caribbean," Problems of Communism, July-August, 1984, p. 1-3.

⁵⁵Valenta, p. 4.

⁵⁶Valenta, p. 1-3.

and demonstrations, and advocated violent revolution.⁵⁷ These incidents were ruthlessly suppressed by Gairy's Secret Police. Maurice Bishop was severely beaten and in 1974 his father, Rupert Bishop, was killed in a demonstration.⁵⁸

March 13, 1979, while Gairy was attending the spring session of the United Nations, to speak on UFO's, a small, well-organized party of NJM seized control of the army headquarters and the only radio station on the island. Gairy denied there had been a coup, but the NJM was in power and would remain so until October 1983.

The NJM was marked by political competition and ambition from the beginning. Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard won two of the three seats awarded to the NJM in the elections of 1976. Bishop was the popular charismatic leader and Coard the intellectual party technocrat. Coard attempted to push the party more radically toward Leninism in 1977.⁵⁹ The NJM later declared their failure to adopt:

Leninist approach to part building strategy and tactics... as the major failing of this stage of the revolution.⁶⁰

The NJM was a Leninist party when it seized power. It proceeded to develop close ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba,

⁵⁷The Grenada Papers, Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984.

⁵⁸Valenta, "Leninism In The Caribbean," p. 3.

⁵⁹Valenta, p. 2-4.

⁶⁰The Grenada Papers.

Eastern Block Countries, and Korea.⁶¹ In his "Line of March" speech, Bishop describes the heavy handed control of his regime to build socialism in rural Grenada. Bishop stated the party must develop "a serious Marxist Leninist van guard party."

The NJM attempted to learn from fraternal Communist parties often invoking Lenin or citing historical examples that had been used by an earlier Communist Party. The final such example was the "Afghan" solution referred to regarding the events leading up to the Oct. 12 coup removing Bishop as Prime Minister.

Bishop stated that following the March '79 Revolution fourteen members of the "petty-bourgeoisie," "national bourgeoisie," and capitalists sectors were named to comprise the people's revolutionary government for the express purpose of calming the fears of "imperialism" (read US and British) to prevent intervention. This speech, given by Bishop to a general meeting of the party, September 13, 1982, outlines NJM's approach to their relationship with the petty and national bourgeoisie mentioned earlier, justice in Grenada under NJM, and freedom of the press:

It is important to note comrades that while we are in alliance with sectors of the bourgeoisie...they are not part of our dictatorship. They are not part of our rule and control...

⁶¹See Series of documents on, cooperation and arm transfers contained in The Grenada Papers, and Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection.

...When they want to put out a newspaper and we don't want that, we close it down...if the truth is told they have been suppressed by the dictatorship.

There were 183⁻detainees documented by the Bishop government as political prisoners.⁶²

Undated reports, discovered with government documents, were used to monitor the activities of "internal elements." The undated and unsigned reports identified: "enemy forces;" "our forces;" "objectives;" contacts;" and "population." These reports were specifically used to monitor Grenadian dissidents and the American students.⁶³

Grenada cannot be discussed apart from Soviet influence. The NJM employed a one party rule dictatorship using detention and torture to maintain control. This in itself would not endanger US interests or Grenada's neighbors. Grenada's Ambassador to Moscow, W. Richard Jacobs, in a letter to Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard outlines what the Soviet Union expected of their Grenadian allies:

...We have to be seen at least as influencing...at least in the English speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity. At the same time, we have to

⁶²Maurice Bishop, "Line of March Speech," 9/13/82, The Grenada Papers, p. 58-72.

⁶³"Belmont Surveillance Report" and "Plan of GI, (General Intelligence) Operation," The Grenada Papers, p. 89-106.

develop normal state to state relations with our neighbors.... To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold our prestige will be greatly enhanced...a candidate is Surinam...and Belize.⁶⁴

In October 1980, Grenada signed its first arms agreement with the Soviet Union. The first shipment included 12 mortars, 24 anti-tank grenade launches, 54 machine guns, communication equipment, and spare parts. Additionally, they had already received 1000 automatic rifles from Cuba and 2000 uniforms from Nicaragua. Later shipments added eight armored personnel carriers, two armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicles, 1000 submachine guns and other assorted equipment. Virtually, all of the arms equipment was shipped via Cuba and unloaded under cover of darkness.⁶⁵ Additional agreements were discovered among captured documents called for delivery of weapons between 1980-85. There included 50 armored personnel carriers, 60 mortars, 60 heavy guns, 50 portable rocket launches, 50 light anti-tank grenade launches, 2000 submarine guns, 2 patrol gunboats, 12,000 rounds of ammunition, small arms and various other equipment.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Embassy of Grenada in the USSR letter from W. Richard Jacobs to Unison Whiteman and Bernard Coard of July 11, 1983, Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, Dept. of State and Dept. of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1984, Document 26.

⁶⁵Valenta, p. 11-12.

⁶⁶Valenta, p. 12-13.

The NJM Party assured its dominance over all the organs of government by placing party members as supervisors. This guaranteed party primacy in government organizations. As a result the 2000 man, Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) continued to follow the instructions of the NJM Central Committee after Bishop had been over thrown.⁶⁷

Economic conditions improved somewhat, unemployment decreased from 40-33% but the economy remained in dire straits and by the summer of 1983 many disillusioned party members began to resign. In the Soviet traditions of "self-criticism," the Coard faction blamed the central committee itself, which under the leadership of Bishop was guilty of a "cult of personality" and "right opportunism."

Coard argued that the party had regressed ideologically as evidenced by their failure to whole heartedly support the Soviet line on Afghanistan and KAL 007. Continuing economic difficulties still plagued the country, negative cash flow threatened additional investments in key industries.⁶⁸

Coard pointed out his own resignation six months earlier to eliminate stress on the party. He concluded that personality conflicts prevented him from accomplishing the

⁶⁷Valenta, p. 6. See also The Grenada Papers, p. 325.

⁶⁸The Grenada Papers, p. 270.

programs to implement "full Leninization of the party."
The Central Committee invited Coard to join Bishop in joint Leadership.⁶⁹⁻

This criticism took place in September of 1983. On September 25, 1983, Bishop agreed to joint leadership. He would be out of the country from September 27 to October 8. He realized he did not have the means to resist. However, following his return he did not appear willing to share power with Coard. Bishop was accused of spreading rumors in the street to discredit Coard.

The Polit Bureau meeting of October 12, identified Bishop's "threat" to call on the workers for help as a "Gairy attitude." Their logic, therefore, concluded that he was building a "personality cult;" this, then, was evidence of "right opportunism." Therefore, he wasn't a communist and couldn't lead the party.⁷⁰ October 14, Coard and General Hudson Austin formally ousted Bishop placing him and Jacquelin Craft, his mistress, Education Minister, and mother of his son, under house arrest.

Ian Lambert, a Coard backer in rather neat rationalization stated that: The country could have only one Prime Minister, since Bernard Coard is a communist, Coard should be the prime minister. If anyone was killed it would be

⁶⁹The Grenada Papers, p. 259-270.

⁷⁰The Grenada Papers, p. 316-322.

Bishop's responsibility for spreading the rumor that Coard's faction planned to shoot him. Eight days later when mass demonstrations freed Bishop, fifty people were killed and Bishop was executed.⁷¹ The Coard faction attempted to keep the shake up secret. Unison Whiteman, Foreign Minister, and three other pro-Bishop ministers resigned on the 18.⁷² Whiteman led a crowd of several thousand demonstrators, who ignored shots fired by the guards and freed Bishop and Craft. The crowd with Bishop proceeded to market square and then to Fort Rupert.⁷³

The fort offered arms as well as access to radio and telephones. The charismatic Bishop had not lost his populist support as evidenced by the size of the demonstrators (estimated to be 10,000, 10% of the population). The people according to Grenadian journalists Alister Hughes, "had gone Bishop, not socialist."⁷⁴ Coard feared a popular uprising.

According to "Bulletin from Main Political Department" of 10/20/83, a post coup document produced by the party, the crowd overran and disarmed officers and soldiers at army

⁷¹The Grenada Papers, p. 316-335.

⁷²The Grenada Papers, p. 11.

⁷³Whitaker and others, p. 42.

⁷⁴Valenta, p. 2-19.

headquarters. Bishop then allegedly proceeded to beat and whip the soldiers who refused to support him. Then according to this document, arms were passed out to the crowd who opened fire on the soldiers. In the fight Bishop and several of his supporters were killed.⁷⁵

Another account of the incidents of "Bloody Monday" reported the army opened fire first,⁷⁶ attacking the fort with armored personnel carriers. Bishop too weak to lead a defense surrendered and along with an undetermined number of supporters was shot despite his plea for mercy.

Coard played a central role in deposing Bishop, however, he managed to stay out of the limelight so well that the Western press speculated he had also been executed in Austin's bid for power. In fact, it appears that Austin acted as Coard's spokesman. Coard thus used Austin's popularity to attempt to blunt the public reaction to Bishop's death.⁷⁷ General Hudson Austin announced a 24 hour shoot to kill curfew.⁷⁸ There was a great deal of speculation regarding who was in charge: Austin? Cornwall? Coard?

On Oct 21, a Navy task force on the way to Lebanon was diverted for possible evacuation of US citizens in Grenada.

⁷⁵The Grenada Papers, p. 340-342.

⁷⁶Whitaker and others, p. 43.

⁷⁷Valenta, p. 20.

⁷⁸Whitaker and others, p. 41.

There just happened to be a Marine Amphibious Ready Group about to deploy to Lebanon. This serendipitous situation enabled the operation to be conducted with complete operational security.

In Grenada, the party called for "national unity to turn back foreign aggression." In a statement reminiscent of Bishop's use of the "beourgeoisie" as outlined in the "Line of March Speech,"⁷⁹ Major Christian Strode announced several moves in an attempt to prevent US action.⁸⁰ Strode stated:

Grenada wanted to establish better relations with the US than Grenada has had in the past...in two weeks the military would hand over power to a committee representing all sectors of Grenadian society...and that Grenada would pursue a non-aligned policy.

Strode also promised to allow two US Consular officials the opportunity to visit Grenada and meet with US citizens. Donald Cruz, US Consular officer from Barbados, visited Grenada Friday, Oct 21. He met with Major Leon Cornwall head of the Revolutionary Council as well as with the medical students. The students told him they were afraid. Cruz then experienced some tense moments when the plane returning to pick him up was not allowed to land.⁸¹

Governor General Sir Paul Scoon smuggled a message to Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados. The message transmitted

⁷⁹The Grenada Papers.

⁸⁰Whitaker and others, p. 40.

⁸¹Thomas DeFrank and John Walcott, "The Invasion Countdown," Newsweek, Nov 7, 1983, p. 75.

in his capacity as Governor General in the absence of an identifiable government, in accordance with British common law, reported chaos and asked for help. The Eastern Caribbean Nations requested help from Washington.⁸² US Consular Officer Cruz' cable following his visit to Grenada reinforced the administration's conviction to act.

The People of Grenada welcomed US forces as liberators. Grenadian reactions were characterized by Michael Sarenouche who shouted: "I love it! I love it! I love it, Uncle Sam!" every time he heard US gunfire.⁸³ US students were in danger or at least they felt they were. The students kissed the ground upon their return to US soil.

It is too early to determine if Grenada will develop the ability to continue a government responsive to its citizens. Grenada held elections in December 1984, electing Herbert Blaize. The last US troops prepared to leave among shouts of "America must stay."

⁸²Frank and Walcott, p. 75.

⁸³Linda Prout, "Let's Clean It Up," Newsweek, Nov 7, 1983, p. 71.

IV. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

These two incidents, the 1965 Dominican crisis and the 1983 Grenadian action, share many common features yet each must be viewed in its own unique context. In both instances, actions were taken to protect US citizens endangered by mass violence and the absence of a stable government with the capability to protect them. In both cases, a primary American objective was to halt or prevent the spread of communism in the hemisphere. In both instances, US citizens inadvertently found themselves under fire by elements that could not be readily identified nor controlled by a recognizable government.

Both Presidents Johnson and Reagan saw US relations consistent with the view expressed in NSC-68. In both instances, they realized that their actions were not in keeping with international law or a policy of non-intervention. They believed that they were fighting Soviet aggression in an indirect manner. In Grenada, there was unquestionably Soviet influence and a desire to export the revolution. They both realized that they were making an internationally unpopular decision. The decisions were made to avoid a worse domestic problem, as well as to counter Soviet aggression.

In the Dominican Republic, the Johnson administration made an early determination that the coup of April 1965

which began as a move to re-establish the constitutionally elected government of Juan Bosch was either supported by or would be overwhelmed by Cuban/Soviet backed communist elements in the rebel movement. The allegation was never conclusively proved. Additionally, Johnson's fear that the US electorate did not possess the sophistication and mental acuity necessary to recognize the threat led him to exaggerate the dangers to US citizens. Johnson's exaggerations cost him credibility and public support. There was no need for such exaggeration. The situation that existed was bad enough.

Grenada was clearly an East/West confrontation. This incident could not have been accomplished by a peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force can't fight its way ashore. It can only function when there is some hope of cooperating factions. Grenada's diplomatic problems stem from the apparent notion of the Reagan administration that international organizations are useless.

Diplomacy and international organizations were used after the fact in the case of the Dominican Republic and virtually ignored with respect to Grenada. Neither, however, was employed to the extent possible. In the case of the Dominican Republic, a meeting of the OAS was called and Ambassadors of influential Latin American countries were briefed after the decisions were made. The policies carried out were accomplished "on the run" in the ad hoc

manner of the Kennedy and Johnson administration. The White House staff acted as a surrogate state department.⁸⁴

President Reagan acted without prior consultation with British Prime Minister Thatcher, who had a strong historical interest in Grenada. This failure to consult with Britain, at least as soon as we were discussing the operation with the Eastern Caribbean States, suggest that Reagan remains unconvinced of the need for allies. This lack of diplomacy coupled with the quick application of military power at a time of increased tension in Europe over nuclear weapons strained the US/European alliance. Additionally this disregard for allies sensibilities will not serve US interest in the Western Hemisphere.

From the standpoint of international law the US did have sufficient justification to take action to protect US citizens. US action encompassed much more than this narrow objective. The actions undertaken were accomplished to benefit the people of the countries involved. They were not legal but the national leadership considered them just.

The legality of US action will be overshadowed domestically by the success of the operation and by the captured documents. US students "kissing American soil" buried the issue for the mass public. Americans will accept a lapse of legality if they believe the cause is just. Traditionally

⁸⁴Nathan and Oliver, p. 44.

Americans have gotten as much law and order as we thought we needed.⁸⁵

The use of international organizations is of particular interest. In the case of the Dominican Republic, every one of the objectives could have been met through an international peacekeeping force. President Johnson could have authorized a marine escort for the initial evacuation of US citizens. Coordinated with this move made a joint UN/OAS plea to establish an international peacekeeping force under the command of Brazil or some other regional or UN nation. We could have focused on the humanitarian need to effect a cease fire and act as mediators in negotiating a conflict. However, to have done this he could not have considered the conflict of vital US interest. A superpower placing a vital interest in the hands of a multi-lateral organization is not feasible.

By down playing communist influence early in the struggle, we may have prevented the crisis from becoming an East/West issue. The opportunity was there in the early days to have used third party measures with US support. This would have prevented the action from being unilateral as well as getting Latin support. Once the crisis became identified as East/West, the majority of third world nations quickly lost interest in cooperating with the US.

⁸⁵Dennis W. Brogan, The American Character, Second edition, New York, Vintage Books, 1956, p. 60.

The situation in Grenada did not lend itself to establishing a peace keeping force. Additionally, immediately following our tragedy in Beirut this option probably would not have been feasible.

Grenada and the Dominican Republic are tropical island countries with agrarian economies. The Dominican Republic is a one commodity economy based on sugar. Sugar accounts for 48% of its exports. The United States is its major trading partner with 83% of exports going to the US and 50% of its imports coming from the US. The country occupies the eastern 2/3 of the island of Hispanola and covers 18,704 square miles. Its population of just over 4 million is 60% rural.⁸⁶

Grenada is a tiny island 21 miles long and 12 miles wide. Grenada's economy is based on agriculture and tourism. The principal crops are bananas, cocoa, and nutmeg. Unlike the Dominican Republic, Grenada's cultivated land was primarily in the hands of small farmers. Less than 1% of farm holdings are greater than 100 acres, and 87% of farms were five acres or less. Grenada's major trading partner, as of 1975 before the NJM developed a Soviet client relationship, has been Britain. The UK accounted for 70% of all exports and 35% of its imports.

⁸⁶1970 figures.

The United States has since the time of Theodore Roosevelt been closely involved with Dominican affairs. The country was originally settled by Spanish explorers in the late 15th century then abandoned for the more lucrative shores of Mexico and Peru. Colonial control remained in the hands of Spain except for a brief period, 1795-1809, when control of the island of Hispanola passed to France. The Dominican Republic declared its independence in 1821 but was occupied by Haiti until 1844. Grenada has a tradition of English colonialism and plantation rule. Grenada received its independence in 1974. The close association between the US government and the Dominican Republic through aid, trade, and prior military occupation naturally influenced US action.

In the Grenada action, the sitting government did not have good relations with the US. Maurice Bishop had taken over the island with a 40 man force in 1979.⁸⁷ He had proclaimed himself a Marxist Leninist and developed close ties with the Soviet Union and various radical regimes, such as Fidel Castro in Cuba and Moammar Khadafi of Libya.

The US had never been a major influence on the island. The most significant US presence was the large number of US students enrolled in the medical school at St. Georges. The British were the traditional major influence in Grenada.

⁸⁷Valenta, p. 4.

The Dominican crisis was a civil war that began as a constitutionalist movement and remained confined to the city of Santo Domingo. The US feared that one side was or would be dominated by Soviet/Cuban communists. Grenada on the other hand was a coup among the oligarchy. There were US citizens in danger in both incidents: Rebels with machine guns fired their weapons indiscriminately at the Embajador Hotel evacuation site in Santo Domingo. In Grenada, US medical students were under close surveillance amid a 24 hour shoot to kill curfew announced by General Austin.

The Dominican Republic was in a state of anarchy in the city of Santo Domingo. The revolt never spread into the country side but remained confined to the city and immediate outskirts. There were dead bodies decaying in the streets. Innocent people were being killed as armed groups roamed the streets looting. Whether or not the revolution would have succeeded or would have benefited the Dominican people cannot be determined.

The citizens of Grenada were oppressed by one party rule as discussed in Chapter III. Captured documents in Grenada indicates that had the coup there been completed and the new regime allowed to consolidate power their fate would not have improved and may have worsened. The course outlined was for continued one party dictatorship, suppression of dissent, and more radical Leninization of the party.

The mass public had supported a popular charismatic leader and his killers feared a public uprising. US students were effectively hostages unable to leave due to the curfew imposed by General Austin.

Grenadian officials attempted to placate the US in this regard by allowing US consular visits with government spokesmen and with the students. The consular officer's impressions along with Governor General Scoon's plea for help confirmed Reagan's assessment that action was required.

The Dominican Republic represented anarchy and civil war. The population within the city of Santo Domingo were sufficiently divided to provide support for guerrilla operations under attack. To have advanced on the rebel forces would have required an intensive house to house operation that would have extracted high cost in lives as well as funds. Such an operation may have resulted in the destruction of the democratic process as Slater and Lowenthal among others feared.

Grenada represented an armed oligarchy without popular support. The military was given a clear objective, the operation was conducted by a specially designated task force comprised of units already scheduled to deploy. The task force operated under the command of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcals. The Reagan administration style of leadership was such that once the decision to utilize a military force to execute the policy, there was little extraneous flow of

information outside the chain of command. Admiral Metcalf, by feeding constantly his most up-to-date information and intelligence to his superiors along with his intentions, prevented the chaos of conflicting instructions. A military problem of providing distant commanders with real time information is that it results in a constant temptation to input commands from a multi-headed command structure. A military operation must have one commander responsible for the operation.

The other most significant difference from a military perspective is the size of the country. Grenada measures 133 square miles. It has an airport at either end of the island, situated north/south. It has suitable beaches for landing force operations. Its physical location is such that its major supporters Cuba nor the Soviet Union could marshal sufficient force to counter the US task force. As mentioned earlier, its population had ceased to support the "government."

US troops arrived unopposed as a security force in the Dominican Republic. US action stopped short of full support for either side in the Dominican crisis and was heavily criticized by spokesmen for both sides. Although heavily opposed by Cuban and Grenadian soldiers, US troops in the Grenada landing were welcomed by the public as liberators.

US unilateral action was taken partly because of Johnson's sense of urgency, his need to personally control

everything within his power. For example, in the case of ex-ambassador and special envoy John Bartlow Martin, the decision was made to send Martin to the Dominican Republic as an extra observer to aid Ambassador Bennett. The decision was made at a presidential meeting and Martin was dispatched immediately to catch a plane.⁸⁸ President Johnson was too close to the problem to effect long term planning yet too distant to effectively control the operation.

The amount and level of command that exercised control of military forces was a significant difference. The Dominican Republic never had a clear military objective other than to maintain a presence and protect lives. This was a military presence for political purposes. The operation was run completely by the White House. A command center was set up manned twenty-four hours a day with direct access to the president and White House staff.

In contrast, President Reagan played the part of the decisive president who assigned a military objective to a military commander then allowed his commander to execute the orders without interference. Grenada offered a clear military objective: Rescue US citizens from two locations on the island and take the island from a possibly confused dictatorship that would be defended with assistance from Cuban troops.

⁸⁸ Oral History of John Bartlow Martin.

The information flow made possible by modern technology and Johnson's penchant for personal control resulted in constant communication yet much inaccurate and confusing intelligence information. The poor intelligence partially caused by the intense involvement of the White House in embassy affairs, and contradictory statements by administration officials, partially resulting from incomplete information with a rapidly changing scenario, combined to frustrate the press, who subsequently lost faith in the administration's view of the crisis.

The press then sought out rebel opinions among a diverse group of anti-Reid Cabral rebels. Some were constitutionalists, some were communist, many were opportunists seeking personal gain. US media reporters contacted rebel leaders, who eagerly espoused their constitutionalists views. The rebels weren't held to the same scrutiny as the administration.

These views contrasted with the darker interpretation of the Johnson administration regarding more radical members of the revolt. This conflict and time lag applying Johnson's statement concerning incident of one phase of the operation to a later phase reinforced the media's distrust of the administration's view and exacerbated the flow of information problem. The embassy reported "unconfirmed reports of beheadings" which Johnson embellished to justify his actions. These reports were inaccurate and resulted in embarrassment for the administration.

Reagan, on the other hand, because he had turned the operation over to the military was able to say he had no information other than what everyone else had. This in effect transferred much of the media's criticism from the administration to Admiral Metcalf.

In both cases, the president made a tough decision and chose the course he believed to be just. These two men shared a distrust of the Soviet Union that has been justified by documents captured in Grenada.

The final similarity is that in both cases US efforts were directed toward promoting free elections and withdrawing US troops as rapidly as possible. Free elections were held and US troops withdrawn after 18 months.

A. CONCLUSION

Militarily the Grenadian and Dominican actions were quite different. The swift success of "Operation Urgent Fury" proved that the US could plan and execute an amphibious landing under fire, on short notice, on a 12 mile by 21 mile island, whose population did not support the defending armed forces. These are significant qualifiers.

The incidents resulted in venomous denunciation by Nicaraguans, who have been paranoid regarding a potential US intervention in Nicaragua. A Nicaraguan invasion would be exponentially more difficult for many reasons not the least of which is US troops would be fighting a nation not an armed oligarchy.

We must understand the limitations of military power. There is not a military solution that can solve the problems of Latin America. Although in Grenada, the process could not have begun without a military presence. We have demonstrated an ability to win the war. Now we must win the peace. It is a task much more difficult. One problem with military intervention is that by doing so the intervening country shoulders responsibility for the problems of the host country.

The Dominican Republic's major problems were economic disparity and opportunistic corruption in its political forum. Dominicans needed a political spokesman who would be a good loser. There wasn't one. The political problem was eased during the post intervention transition government when the OAS commission and US pressure forced radicals of both sides out of the Dominican Republic. Both Wessin y Wessin and Caamano were forced out of the country.

Dominicans do have the political machinery in place to give the citizenry a voice in government. A democracy after all isn't necessarily fair, Nazi Germany was a democratically elected government. Democracy does provide the public an opportunity to choose a regime that will be responsive to their needs. Dominicans must do the rest.

The US is now preparing to withdraw the last troops from Grenada. Grenadians want a continued US presence.⁸⁹ The US, however, is not prepared for an extended military presence in Grenada. We have accomplished our quick fix. Grenada still has an unemployment problem and many fear that former soldiers will recover hidden weapons and prey on the population once the remaining Americans leave. The US has provided \$57 million in aid spread out over two years. Hopefully, this will enable Prime Minister Herbert Blaize's New National Party to invigorate Grenada's economy.

President Johnson saw communist influence in the Dominican Republic out of proportion to their numbers. President Reagan seems to view communism as synonymous with Soviet. His critics claim that he is overly predisposed to blame a litany of Latin American problems on "communist insurgents." However, just because Reagan is paranoid about Soviet involvement in Latin American problems doesn't mean they aren't there. The sources of instability in the Caribbean are not always contained in the country.⁹⁰

President Reagan has an objectivist view of foreign policy. His assumptions are that we are in a fundamental

⁸⁹"Grenadians Want Yanks to Stay," Monterey (Calif.) Peninsula Herald, May 12, 1985, p. 9A.

⁹⁰Jiri Valenta, "The USSR and the Caribbean Basin," Rift and Revolution in Central America, American Enterprise Institute, 1984, p. 287.

conflict with the Soviet Union and it is a zero sum game. We must be willing to protect our national interests in a way that will minimize miscalculation. We must also keep in mind that there remains in Latin America significant anti-American sentiment devoid of East/West considerations. We must recognize the difference between a leftist national movement and a Soviet client relationship. This will require more attention to Latin America and the Caribbean affairs. In the words of Vernon Walters: "The Caribbean isn't our backyard it's our frontyard."⁹¹

The Soviet Union appeared to believe the US had lost its will to employ military power in the aftermath of Viet Nam. The Grenada invasion may cause them to re-evaluate that idea.⁹² The action has limited application. The US must not view Grenada as a completed operation. We must develop a long term coherent plan designed to address specific economic and social problems of the regions.

⁹¹Vernon Walters, Soviet/Cuban Strategy In The Third World After Grenada, A Conference Report, Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison Chairmen, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 51.

⁹²Valenta, USSR in the Caribbean, p. 299.

APPENDIX A

PERSONS WHO PLAYED LEADING ROLES IN THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Joaquin Balaguer President of the Dominican Republic when Trujillo was assassinated and living in exile in New York when the 1965 revolution began. He became the leading candidate of Dominican moderates for president and on June 1, 1966 was elected over Bosch and Bonnelly.

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from March 9, 1964 until April 1966. He made the basic recommendations that led to U.S. action.

Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit Chief of a three-officer military junta at the San Isidro base who formally notified Bennett his forces could not be responsible for the safety of Americans in Santo Domingo.

Rafael Bonnelly Rightist political leader former President of the Dominican Republic. A candidate for President in the election of June 1, 1966.

Rafael Bonilla Aybar Owner of the newspaper Prensa Libre. He was hunted by rebel mobs and took refuge in the Guatemalan Embassy. A rumor that he was to be evacuated with American civilians led the mob to descend on the Embajador Hotel.

Juan Bosch Elected President of the Dominican Republic in December 1962 and overthrown the following September. Bosch was in exile in Puerto Rico when the revolution of 1965 was mounted in his name. He returned in September 1965, to campaign for president as head of the PRD.

McGeorge Bundy Presidential advisor and chief of a mission sent to Santo Domingo by President Johnson in May, 1965.

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker United States Ambassador to the OAS.

Col. Francisco Caamano Deno Dominican rebel military officer, took refuge in the Embassy of El Salvador and emerged to become President of the "Constitutionalist government" in the Ciudad Nueva, a rebel controlled section of Santo Domingo, until the Provisional Government came into being on September 3, 1965.

William B. Connett Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, who was in charge there in Bennett's absence when the violence began.

Antonio Guzman Member of Bosch's PRD party proposed to head the Provisional Government. Guzman eventually became vice presidential candidate on the Bosch ticket. He was elected president in 1978.

Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras Commissioned a general after taking part in the assassination of Trujillo, Imbert emerged as head of the Government of National Reconstruction junta until the Provisional Government took control.

John Bartlow Martin Former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic who was sent back by President Johnson after the revolution to assist Bennett.

Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann President Johnson's principal advisor on Latin American affairs.

Jose Rafael Molina Urena A Bosch supporter, President of the Chamber of Deputies, who assumed the Provisional Presidency of the first short-lived rebel government. He took asylum in a foreign embassy when the rebel cause appeared lost on April 27.

Gen. Salvador Montas Guerrero Commander of Dominican troops of the San Cristobal garrison who marched from the west against the rebels when the armed forces decided to resist Bosch's return.

Secretary-General Jose A. Mora A Uruguayan who heads the OAS secretariat, he arrived in the Dominican Republic on May 1 in the role of peace-maker between the two warring factions.

Lt. General Bruce Palmer, Jr. U.S. airborne officer who commanded American contingents and served as Deputy Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force.

Gen. Hugo Panasco Alvim A Brazilian officer who commanded the IAPF.

Donald Reid Cabral Dominant member of the Triumvirate, overthrown by the April 24 revolution.

Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero Chief of the Dominican Navy at the time of the revolution, who took arms against the rebels.

Gen. Marcos Antonio Rivera Cuesta Armed forces chief of staff under the Triumvirate overthrown by the April 24 revolution.

Gen. Jesús de los Santos Cespedes Chief of the Dominican Air Force which was the first military arm to attack the rebels.

Capt. Mario Pena Tavares Aide-de-camp to Gen. Rivera Cuesta who assisted in the arrest of his commander at the outset of the revolt on April 24.

Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin Commander of the armed forces training center at San Isidro. Wessin attempted to storm the rebel area in the Ciudad Nueva but lost heart and withdrew to his base. He was forced into retirement and exile.

APPENDIX B

PERSONS WHO PLAYED LEADING ROLES IN GRENADIAN REVOLUTION, 1983

Hudson Austin A key figure in the 1979 leftist revolution, Austin was a commander of Grenada's army and militia, which overthrew Bishop, and head of the 16-member council installed after the coup.

Fitzroy Bain A union leader, Fitzroy Bain was killed with Bishop following the Coard takeover in October 1983.

Norris Bain Minister of Housing, Norris Bain was killed by the Coard forces in October 1983.

Maurice Bishop Prime Minister and early leader of the New Jewel Movement. Bishop was elected to Parliament in 1976. Bishop was killed in the aftermath of the coup engineered by Coard in 1983.

Bernard Coard Deputy Prime Minister in the Bishop government, and Minister of Finance, Trade, Industry, and Planning. He was founder of the Organization for Revolutionary Education and Liberation, which merged into the New Jewel Movement, but which was later reportedly started anew as the Organization for Educational Advancement and Research.

Phyllis Coard Brenard Coard's wife, and head of Radio Free Grenada and the National Women's Organization.

Leon Cornwell Grenada's army chief and ambassador to Cuba under Bishop, Cornwall was also a leading Coard backer.

Jacqueline Creft Minister of Education, youth, and social affairs in Bishop's cabinet, Creft also lived with Bishop, with whom she had a son named Vladimir, age 4. She was killed during the Coard takeover.

Donald Cruz U.S. Consular Officer to Barbados, who went to Grenada at the New Jewel Movement's invitation in Oct. 1983.

Sir Eric M. Gairy Founded the Grenada Labor Party in 1950, became prime minister after independence from Britain in 1974. Gairy, a former nightclub owner and spiritualist, was in New York to speak at the United Nations about UFOs when he was overthrown in absentia in a coup led by Maurice Bishop.

George Louison Minister of Agriculture under Bishop, Louison strongly defended Bishop during the Coard coup, but was not killed.

Admiral Joseph Metcalf Commander of Naval Task Force for "Operation Urgent Fury" in Grenada, 1983.

Unison Whiteman A co-founder of Grenada's New Jewel Movement and foreign minister under Bishop, Whiteman was in his late 30s when he was killed by the Coard faction.

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